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HATE SPEECH—DEFINITIONS &
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Katharine Gelber*
James Weinstein’s paper is a thoughtful, refreshing and
considered contribution to the ongoing debate over whether or
not hate speech laws can be justified in liberal democratic orders.
As a political scientist who has spent 20 years investigating,
analyzing, and reporting on the introduction, implementation,
and effects of hate speech laws, I wish to focus in my commentary
on the empirical assumptions and claims that inform Weinstein’s
argument. I will focus on three. The first is his failure to
conceptualize hate speech in a way that is commensurate with
much of the philosophical literature focussing on definitions of
hate speech. The second is his apparent reluctance to concede that
hate speech (in both vituperative and more modest forms) is
capable of harming political participation to the degree he would
require, or in the ways he would require, in order for hate speech
laws to be justifiable in political legitimacy terms. The third are
his empirical claims about the operation of hate speech laws in
practice.
WHAT IS HATE SPEECH?
On the first point, Weinstein’s article lacks a clear conception
of hate speech. To be fair, it is part of Weinstein’s argument that
the lack of a clear definition of hate speech is in fact part of the
problem. In part, I agree with him. In particular, I find the use of
the term ‘hate’ to be misleading in this context, since it implies
that the defining feature of hate speech is virulent dislike of a
person for any reason. As I will explain below, this is not my, or

* Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of Queensland. I am grateful
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others’, view of the defining feature of hate speech. Nevertheless,
it is a term that is widely used in the literature.
Weinstein’s complaint about the lack of definition of hate
speech, however, is different from mine. He claims that, in spite
of Waldron’s claim that hate speech laws only restrict people from
expressing their views in particularly vituperative ways, and not
from expressing their points of view on any topic, hate speech laws
do in fact result in poor applications in practice. He argues further
that these applications put people through difficult and time
consuming legal processes without good reason. I will deal
separately with this latter claim below.
Weinstein navigates through this component of his argument
by describing hate speech in his introduction as expression that
“demeans.”1 Later, when discussing a case adjudicated in the
European Court of Human Rights, he suggests that because
Gillmerveen’s discourse was “odious” but had “little vituperation
and no use of epithets,” it was a case of the misapplication of hate
speech laws.2 He similarly laments the lack of vituperation and/or
epithets in some of his other examples of the misapplication of
hate speech laws. He implies quite strongly, therefore, that (at
least) two of the defining features of hate speech, properly
understood, are vituperation and the use of epithets.
With respect, this pays no attention to the considerable body
of literature that has developed over the last few decades, which
discusses how hate speech is expression that materially and
substantively harms its targets in the saying of that speech (and
not only in terms of a discreet, consequential harm arising from
it). These speech-act theory informed perspectives both on racist
hate speech3 and on pornography4 argue that harm can occur
whether the hate speech is expressed in vituperative terms or not,
and whether epithets are used or not. According to this literature,
the defining features of hate speech are not whether it is
1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 527, 527 (2017).
2. Id. at 554.
3. See, e.g., SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH (Ishani
Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012); WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Mari J. Matsuda et al.
eds., 1993).
4. See, e.g., Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
293, 297 (1993). See also Rae Langton, Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and
Pornographers, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 311–59 (1990).
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vituperative and whether or not it contains epithets, but that it
incurs harms discursively when the hate speech is uttered, and
that these harms are analogous to other discriminatory harms,
such as denying someone a service or denying them a job on the
ground of their race or other relevant attribute.
Indeed, in this context Waldron acknowledges that he is not
the first theorist to have developed a liberal argument as to the
viability of regulating hate speech. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, Ronald Dworkin engaged in a fierce debate with other
philosophers on the question of the regulation of pornography. In
that debate, Dworkin argued that the regulation of pornography
was not justifiable on democratic grounds. He viewed the case for
the harm of pornography as inconclusive, and the silencing
argument5 (the argument that pornography as a type of hate
speech operates to “silence” women by rendering their
protestations against sexual mistreatment unable to achieve their
intended outcome of stopping that mistreatment, and by
rendering them unable to be heard as authentic and dignified
speakers) as unconvincing.6 In response, Jennifer Hornsby argued
that he misunderstood the claim that pornography silences
women.7 Rae Langton argued, using a Dworkinian version of
liberalism, that it was possible to make out a consistent case that
pornography ought to be regulable as a violation of women’s civil
rights.8 Jeremy Waldron also acknowledges, in his response to
Weinstein in this volume, that Dworkin’s view of political
legitimacy can sustain an argument that hate speech laws
themselves can contribute to democratic legitimacy.
The debate between Weinstein’s response in this volume and
Waldron’s original piece echoes that earlier one, in the sense that
5. For the most influential arguments on the silencing effects of pornography, see
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Rae Langton, Beyond Belief:
Pragmatics in Hate Speech and Pornography, in SPEECH AND HARM: CONTROVERSIES
OVER FREE SPEECH 72–93 (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012); Rae
Langton, Subordination, Silence, and Pornography’s Authority, in CENSORSHIP AND
SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 261–84 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998);
Rae Langton, Speech Acts, supra note 4.
6. Ronald Dworkin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN: A CELEBRATION
100–09 (Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Avishai Margalit eds., 1991); Ronald Dworkin, Women
and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1993, at 36, 37, 40–42.
7. Jennifer Hornsby, Speech Acts and Pornography, in THE PROBLEM OF
PORNOGRAPHY 220–32 (Susan Dwyer ed., 1995)
8. Rae Langton, Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 311, 311–59 (1990).
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Weinstein speaks past, and appears not to hear or recognize, the
claims that hate speech acts harm in the saying of them, and that
they harm in important ways that silence their targets. This is not
to say that every instance of hate speech must silence its target, as
clearly some instances of hate speech result in wide public
disapprobation, or mobilise counter claims by targets and their
allies. But it is to say that hate speech properly understood is
capable of harming in these ways, and that these harms ought to
be recognized and interpolated into their arguments in ways that
Weinstein has not done.
Understanding speech-act informed claims about how hate
speech harms is important, because if Weinstein had conceived of
hate speech in these terms, it would have had significant
implications for his argument. It would among other things have
undermined his implication that it is only by not regulating hate
speech that we ensure all individuals are able to put forward their
point of view about laws that they may be legitimately coerced
into obeying. He is very concerned with the evangelist
photographer’s right to say that she does not want to take
photographs at a same sex wedding. Yet he simultaneously treats
differently the concerns of a same sex couple who, when faced
with genuine hate speech, come to know through that hate speech
that some people in society deem they are not worthy of equal
treatment, and that their relationship is wrong, and who thereby
become fearful of walking down the street holding hands, and
fearful of violent attacks against them and their property on the
basis of their sexuality. Could not such experiences, and the wider
knowledge of those experiences among all same-sex attracted
people, mean that the same sex couple could be silenced in much
the same way Weinstein’s evangelical photographer felt unable to
express her views before a law on same sex marriage was passed?
Don’t communities who know their members regularly
experience hate speech often feel unable to express their views on
proposed upstream laws for fear they, too, will become targets of
hate speech? I believe that they do, and have undertaken research
showing that hate speech properly understood is one of the
mechanisms by which this inability to express their views comes
about.9

9. Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, Evidencing the Harms of Hate Speech, 22
SOC. IDENTITIES 324 (2016).
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Both Weinstein and Alex Brown10 bemoan the paucity of
evidence on this point, the silencing effect of hate speech (as
opposed to Weinstein’s concern with the silencing effect of hate
speech laws). While there is not a great deal of such evidence,
there are findings from psychology that show that individuals
subjected to non-physical discrimination suffer significant harms
to their physical and mental health.11 These findings bolster and
support the silencing claim, as do arguments in the literature
about the indirect effects of hate speech, including the
maintenance of power imbalances within social hierarchies of
race.12 My own, and my co-author’s, empirical research
interviewing members of communities targeted by hate speech
shows that targets say they experience the harms of hate speech
that are alleged in the literature.13 They testified to effects
including that others were persuaded of negative stereotypes, a
conditioning of the environment such that racism was normalized,
subordination, silencing, fear, victimization, emotional symptoms,
restrictions on freedom, lowering of self-esteem, maintenance of
social imbalances of power, and undermining of their dignity.
They testified that these harms were enduring. It is therefore not
true that there is no evidence that silencing operates in the ways
that defenders of hate speech laws allege.
10. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 575 (citing ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH
LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION (2015))
11. I focus here on the sources that pay particular attention to hate speech as a form
of non-physical discrimination: Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress and Mental Health
in Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129
PSYCHOL. BULL., 674 (2003); Erik Vijleveld et al., The Cortisol Response to Anticipated
Intergroup Interactions Predicts Self-Reported Prejudice, 7 PLOS ONE, no. 3, Mar. 2012,
at 1; Kathryn Freeman Anderson, Diagnosing Discrimination: Stress from Perceived
Racism and the Mental and Physical Health Effects, 83 SOC. INQUIRY 55 (2013); Yin
Paradies et al., Racism as a Determinant of Health: A Protocol for Conducting a Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 2 SYS. REVS. 85 (2013); Gilbert C. Gee, A Multilevel Analysis
of the Relationship Between Institutional and Individual Racial Discrimination and Health
Status, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 615 (2002); Ricci Harris et al., Racism and Health: The
Relationship Between Experience of Racial Discrimination and Health in New Zealand, 63
SOC. SCI. & MED. 1428 (2006); VICTORIAN HEALTH PROMOTION FOUND., MENTAL
HEALTH IMPACTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN VICTORIAN ABORIGINAL
COMMUNITIES (2012).
12. M. R. ALLBROOK, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: ANTI-RACISM INITIATIVES FROM
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
(2001); Barbara Bloch & Tanja Dreher, Resentment and Reluctance: Working With
Everyday Diversity and Everyday Racism in Southern Sydney, 30 J. INTERCULTURAL
STUD. 193 (2009); Kevin M. Dunn & Jacqueline Nelson, Challenging the Public Denial of
Racism for a Deeper Multiculturalism, 32 J. INTERCULTURAL STUD. 587 (2011).
13. Gelber & McNamara, supra note 9.
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THE NEED TO ENSURE MAXIMUM POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION
This brings me to my second point, which is Weinstein’s
emphasis on political participation. He emphasises how important
it is to ensure that opportunities exist “for each individual to
participate as an equal in the public conversation about society’s
collective decisions.”14 He reiterates that “equal opportunity to
participate in the political process, including in the public
discussion of collective decisions, is essential to political
legitimacy,”15 and that “laws about which there can be reasonable
disagreement are subject to being rendered illegitimate if people
capable of self-government are denied the equal opportunity to
participate in the process by which they are enacted.”16 I could not
agree more. The requirement of equal opportunity to participate
in the decision making that affects one’s life is central to
democratic legitimacy.
The quarrel I have is with how Weinstein has applied this
precept; specifically in his failure to acknowledge what would
happen to his argument if he were to concede that hate speech
itself is capable of undermining the equal opportunity in
decisionmaking that he and I agree is fundamental to political
legitimacy.
Where hate speech itself is capable of undermining those
opportunities, and where it can be identified as doing so, it would
be a blinkered view of democratic legitimacy that would
consciously ignore this problem. I have argued this point
previously,17 integrating a Nussbaumian capabilities-approach to
support a strong protection for a broad range of speech with a
Habermasian construction of public discourse, the discourse that
Weinstein18 and Robert Post19 place at the centre of free speech
protection. This produces a robust argument for the protection of
speech on public discourse grounds, based on a recognition that
14. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 528.
15. Id. at 536.
16. Id. at 539.
17. Katharine Gelber, Freedom of Political Speech, Hate Speech and the Argument
from Democracy: the Transformative Contribution of Capabilities Theory, 9 CONTEMP.
POL. THEORY 304 (2010).
18. James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011).
19. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483
(2011).
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the individuals who take part in processes of legitimation become
capable of doing so through their individual participation in
speech-based activities. This view integrates an understanding of
the role of speech in individual agency, with the role of speech in
facilitating the social organisation that underpins democratic
processes of legitimation.
At the same time, this view acknowledges that if the
formation of individuals’ capacities to become capable of
constructing and implementing their own conception of the good
life, and their ability to instantiate that by engaging in processes
of democratic legitimation, were imperilled by some speech, there
is an argument for the regulation (although certainly not an
automatic presumption of the form that regulation should take)20
of that harmful speech. This argument requires us to take
seriously the risks to social justice of some speech. Importantly, it
pertains only to that speech which is capable of imperilling
democratic processes of legitimation in this way. Thus, an
argument for the regulation of hate speech—defined carefully and
in a confined way as speech capable of imperilling the very
processes of democratic legitimation with which Weinstein, Post,
I, and others are concerned—is rendered possible.
My argument rests on a conception of hate speech as speech
that is directed at historically identifiable minorities;21 that targets
them with speech that is harmful to their involvement in processes
of democratic legitimation. This is because, in my view, the
connection of hate speech with historically identifiable and
systemic discrimination is key to its success in discursively
enacting harm to a sufficient degree that it would imperil a target’s
ability to participate in the political decision making that affects
them. This differentiates discursively discriminatory hate speech
from speech that may offend someone, hurt their feelings, be
vituperative, or contain epithets, some of which may be capable
of the discriminatory harms of hate speech, but none of which is
definitively capable of doing so unless other factors are in place.
20. Criminal prohibition is only one (and not my favoured) policy approach to the
problem of hate speech. Other approaches include the civil regulation of hate speech as an
act of discrimination, or providing mechanisms and resources to enable communities to
challenge the messages of hate speech and facilitate their speech-based response, thereby
overcoming the silencing effect.
21. The direction of such speech at historically identifiable minorities is key to its
ability to harm, and not merely to offend, because such speech discursively enacts
discrimination that is analogous to other forms of systemic discrimination.
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This principle overcomes the problems of relying on vituperative
speech, or on the use of epithets, as the defining feature of hate
speech.
It also assists in understanding the problem Weinstein raises
about having a law that prevents a racist landlord from calling
would-be Pakistani tenants “cockroaches,” but does not prevent
those would-be tenants from calling the (presumably Caucasian)
landlord a “cockroach.”22 Weinstein’s steeping in the requirement
under First Amendment jurisprudence to avoid viewpoint
discrimination at all costs blinds him to the differential harms of
these two events. Calling Pakistanis “cockroaches” is a racist term
of abuse that likens a racial minority in a Western society to an
animal that requires extermination. It therefore has a meaning
and force that simply do not apply were the would-be tenants to
call the landlord by the same epithet. Context, social power, and
history matter in determining the harm that is occasioned in hate
speech.
To be sure, the argument I make here introduces a different
challenge in identifying the kinds of hate speech that are capable
of harming in the ways that I have outlined. However, this is not
in principle an insurmountable problem, as the type of hate
speech able to be regulated would need to be sufficiently harmful
to be capable of preventing its targets from participating in
decisions about laws that affect them, to be targeted at historically
identifiable minorities, and to occur within a social context within
which systemic discrimination against that minority persists.23
Even should Weinstein not agree with the argument I have
just outlined, he may admit that it ought to be conceivable in
principle that some hate speech ought to be considered capable of
undermining individuals’ ability to express their own views in
relation to upstream laws that the state will have the right to
coerce them into obeying. If that is the case, then hate speech
itself is capable of undermining the democratic legitimacy that
Weinstein and I are both concerned with protecting.

22. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 542.
23. This is an issue on which Weinstein and I have conversed often, and it is an issue
I am developing further in work-in-progress.
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HOW HATE SPEECH LAWS WORK IN PRACTICE
The third point I wish to raise is Weinstein’s use of anecdotal
claims about the application of hate speech laws in countries
around the world, and his claim that his evidence shows a
“sufficiently large number of cases to show that most hate speech
laws, whatever their intent,”24 do not protect moderate forms of
expressing one’s opinion that are not designed to be captured by
hate speech laws. My quarrel here is that Weinstein has not
substantiated his case.
First, the total number of cases that Weinstein cites in the
main text in which a claim of racial hatred (in some form) was
substantiated is one in Holland, three in England, one in Scotland,
two in Austria, one in Finland, one in France, one in Spain and
one in Canada. This is a total of 11 cases, some of which by
Weinstein’s own admission did not involve “hate speech”
legislation, but rather other public order types of provisions that
were used to shut down what was perceived to be hate speech. He
adds to his list four complaints in which a claim of racial hatred
was not substantiated, including (in the main text),25 two in
France, one in Belgium and one in England. The total of cases to
which he refers is therefore 15.26 A “sufficiently large number of
cases” to evidence widespread misapplication of hate speech laws
this most certainly is not.
The first point is that, if Weinstein wishes to show the
misapplication of hate speech laws, it would be helpful if he would
limit his enquiry to hate speech laws, and not the misapplication
of any other law. Jeremy Waldron also makes this point in his
reply to Weinstein in this volume.
The second point to make here is that this total of 15 cases in
the main text (30 with additional cases in footnotes) is a miniscule
proportion of the entirety of hate speech complaints that are
made across the globe every year. I do not believe anyone has
calculated the global number of complaints, but just to give a
small indication of how unrepresentative Weinstein’s sample is,
my and my co-author’s recent study into the operation of hate
24. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 561.
25. Weinstein includes some additional cases in his lengthy footnotes. I have only
counted here the ones that appear in the text of the article.
26. In the footnotes 124, 131, and 132, Weinstein also cites and discusses 15 further
cases, making a total of 30 cases. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 558 n. 124, 560-61 nn. 131–
32.
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speech laws in Australia over 25 years showed that the total
number of complaints lodged in any given year in Australia was
approximately 200-350.27 Weinstein’s examples (leaving aside the
Dutch case which occurred in 1979), occurred between 2001 and
2015, with 10 of them occurring between 2001 and 2010. During
the same period of 2001-2010 there were 2128 complaints lodged
in Australia.
In 2010 alone, there were 3770 hate crimes reported in
Germany, which included hate crimes, incitement to hatred, and
propaganda offenses.28 In 2014-2015, there were 30,991 racially
motivated public order offences in England and Wales.29
These figures render Weinstein’s claim that a “sufficiently
large” number of misapplications is occurring unsustainable in
empirical terms. A far more in-depth and systemic study would be
needed regarding the operation of hate speech laws in practice to
sustain this point.
Weinstein does not only claim that the number of such
misapplications is large enough to be worrying. He argues further
that cases that are unsubstantiated are “undoubtedly” causing a
chilling effect on free speech.30 Again, there is insufficient
evidence provided to make such a claim. The Australian study to
which I have already referred has shown that, in spite of claims to
the contrary, no evidence of a chilling effect was found in the
context of 25 years of the operation of hate speech laws in
Australia.31 Instead, Waldron’s empirical intuition—that hate
speech laws by and large operate to prevent harmful hate speech,
but not to stop people debating in non-vilifying ways on matters
of public policy—was strongly upheld by the evidence obtained in
that study.32
Any law will have some misapplications, this is a regular
feature of a range of laws including defamation laws, and the law
27. Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, The Effects of Civil Hate Speech Laws:
Lessons from Australia, 49 L. & SOC. REV. 631, 641–42 (2015).
28. See OSCE Office for Democratic Inst. and Human Rights, Germany, HATE
CRIME REPORTING (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:36 AM), http://hatecrime.osce.org/germany.
29. HANNAH CORCORAN ET AL., HATE CRIME, ENGLAND AND WALES, 2014/15, at
1, 8 (2015).
30. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 559.
31. Gelber & McNamara, supra note 27, at 656–57.
32. Id.; Katharine Gelber & Luke McNamara, Changes in the Expression of Prejudice
in Public Discourse in Australia: Assessing the Impact of Hate Speech Laws on Letters to
the Editor 1992-2010, 20 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 99 (2014).
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of torts. No-one suggests that the existence and occasional
misapplication of defamation laws or of the law of torts means
that the laws themselves are fundamentally flawed in the sense
that they undermine the democratic legitimacy of other,
especially anti-discrimination, laws.
In fact, I agree with Weinstein that some of the cases he
mentions, in particular the cases in which Christians put forward
their views about homosexuality, ought not to have been
considered hate speech and ought not to have been prosecuted.
However, I do not agree that this very small number of cases
substantiates an argument that hate speech laws are misapplied
with sufficient frequency to undermine Waldron’s point that they
are intended only to be applied to genuinely harmful hate speech.

